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Abstract 
 
Classical statistical mechanics posits probabilities for various events to occur, and these 
probabilities seem to be objective chances. This does not seem to sit well with the fact 
that the theory’s time evolution is deterministic. We argue that the tension between the 
two is only apparent. We present a theory of Humean objective chance and show that 
chances thus understood are compatible with underlying determinism and provide an 
interpretation of the probabilities we find in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Classical statistical mechanics (CSM) posits probabilities for various events to occur. Yet the 
theory’s time evolution is deterministic. How can probabilities in a deterministic setting be 
understood? We begin by outlining our own version of Humean Objective Chance, which we 
call THOC (Section 2). We then briefly review the main tenets of CSM and discuss how it 
deals with probabilities (Section 3). We then argue that these probabilities fit the mould of 
THOC; and in doing so we qualify various aspects of our approach to chance (Section 4). 
These qualifications are best discussed in a more general setting, and so we widen the scope 
of our discussion to probabilities in non-fundamental sciences beyond CSM. This brings us to 
a discussion of various presuppositions of THOC and a comparison with other approaches to 
chance (Section 5). In the last section we draw some conclusions.  
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2. Humean Objective Chance  
 
Let e be an event, for instance a coin coming up heads when flipped, and let E be the 
proposition stating that e occurs.1  The chance of E, ch(E), is a real number in the interval [0, 
1] such that:  
 
(1) ch satisfies the axioms of probability;2 
(2) ch is the correct plug-in for X in the Principal Principle; and 
(3) ch supervenes on the Humean Mosaic in the right way,  
 
where X  is the statement that ‘ch(E) =x’. Chances thus defined are Humean Objective 
Chances (HOC) – ‘chances’ for short. We call a statement like X a chance rule.3  Chances are 
linked to setups, which are characterised by setup conditions: relative to a certain physical 
setup condition, the chance of E is x.4 In the example of the coin, the setup conditions are that 
the coin is a (nearly) perfect short cylinder and has a homogenous mass distribution, is spun 
upwards at moderate speeds (thus avoiding that the coin decomposes), lands on a mushy 
surface that leaves the coin intact, etc. To keep notation simple we are not introducing a 
special index for a setup, but it must be remembered that all chance rules are linked to a 
specific type of setup conditions.  
 
We use ‘THOC’ to refer to the entire theory of chance presented in this section. We take (1) 
to be unproblematic;5 (2) and (3) need unpacking. Chances are guides to action, and the most 
important requirement on a theory of chance is that it show how chances can do that. This 
aspect of chances is enshrined in the Principal Principle (PP), which establishes a connection 
between chances and the credences (subjective degree of belief) a rational agent should assign 
to certain events. Roughly, PP says that a rational agent who knows the chance of e should 
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have credence in e’s occurrence equal to the chance of E, as long as the agent has no 
inadmissible knowledge relating to E’s truth. More formally, PP is the rule that for all E, all X 
and all K 
  
 cr(E|X&K) = x,                 (Eq. 1)
  
where ‘cr’ stands for a rational agent’s initial credence, and K is any admissible proposition.6  
 
A crucial question is what counts as an ‘admissible’ proposition. This question has been 
discussed controversially, and we cannot revisit this discussion here.7 Following Hoefer 
(2007), and in line with Lewis’s first characterisation in his (1980), we take a proposition P to 
be admissible with respect to an outcome-specifying proposition E for chance set-up S iff P 
contains only the sort of information whose impact on reasonable credence about E, if any, 
comes entirely by way of impact on credence about the chances of those outcomes. Chance is 
a guide to action when information about E’s truth or falsity is not available.   
 
The essence of the requirement of admissibility is to exclude the agent’s possession of other 
knowledge relevant to the truth of E, the kind of knowledge the possession of which might 
make it no longer sensible to set credence equal to objective chance. To use the usual (and 
silly) example: if you have a crystal ball that you believe reliably shows you future events and 
if your crystal ball shows you the coin toss landing tails and you trust the ball’s revelations, 
then it would not be reasonable to set your credence in tails to 0.5 for that flip – you have 
inadmissible knowledge. This example helps make the notion of admissibility intuitively 
clear. It also points toward an important fact in our world: inadmissible evidence concerning 
future events is not something we typically have – if we did, then chances would be rather 
useless to have. 
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Let us now turn to (3). The Humean Mosaic (HM) is the collection of everything that actually 
happens; that is, all occurrent facts at all times. There is a question about what credentials 
something must have to be considered part of HM, and we will touch upon this question in 
Section 5.2. What matters for now is that irreducible modalities, powers, propensities, 
necessary connections and so forth are not part of HM.8 That is the ‘Humean’ in Humean 
mosaic.  
 
Supervenience requires that chances be entailed by the overall pattern of events and processes 
in HM. A simple example of supervenience is actual frequentism (the view that probabilities 
are actual frequencies): the overall pattern of events uniquely determines the relative 
frequency of an event (if it is well defined), and hence its probability. Note that actual 
frequentism has no frequency tolerance: there cannot be any difference between the chance of 
A and the frequency of A. This contrasts with propensity theories, which have maximal 
frequency tolerance, but fail to satisfy Humean supervenience. THOC strikes a balance 
between these extremes by requiring that chances supervene on HM, but not simply: THOC 
postulates that chances are the numbers assigned to E by probability rules that are part of a 
Best System (BS) of such rules, where ‘best’ means that the system strikes the as good a 
balance as the actual events will allow of simplicity, strength and fit. We then say that a 
probability rule is Humean BS-supervenient on HM (‘HBS-supervenes on HM’, for short) iff 
it is part of a Best System. Clause (3) can now be made more precise: the function ch HBS-
supervenes on HM. 
 
Simplicity and strength are notoriously difficult to explicate. We present a characterisation of 
these that is precise enough for our purposes in Section 4. Throughout section 4 we assume 
that chance rules are formulated in a natural language, thereby ruling out grue/blean-type 
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predicates. We reflect in Section 5.3 on how strong this assumption is and on how damaging 
residual indeterminacies are to our project. Fortunately, fit is a less problematic concept. The 
fit of a system is a matter of the extent to which the actual course of events in HM is likely in 
light of that system: the more likely a system regards the actual course of history as being, the 
better its fit. This explication of fit has certain limitations. It is only readily applicable to 
certain simple sorts of chance system, and Humean mosaics with only finitely many chancy 
events. For, e.g., systems with continuous chance distributions and/or worlds with infinitely 
many chancy events, a different approach is required; we set aside this issue because the cases 
we are interested are covered by the current explication.9 
 
 
3. Thermodynamics and Classical Statistical Mechanics  
 
The behaviour of macroscopic systems like a gas in a box is to a good degree of 
approximation correctly described by thermodynamics (TD). TD introduces macrostates kM  
(where k  is an integer which depends on the specific properties of the system, which are 
characterised by the values of macroscopic parameters such as temperature, pressure and 
volume).10 Macrostates pertain to the system as a whole and neither their definition nor their 
use depends on the microscopic makeup of the system. In a world which is phenomenally 
equivalent to ours but in which there are no atoms and matter is a Cartesian continuum, the 
macrostates of a TD system would be the same and all laws of TD would apply.  
 
The most important of these laws is the so-called Second Law of TD, saying that the TD 
entropy of a closed system cannot decrease. The law needs to be qualified in two ways. First, 
the strict version of the law is only approximately true; it is an empirical fact that entropy of a 
system can fluctuate. Second, it is typically the case that entropy increases (as opposed to just 
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not decrease). Taking these qualifications into account, the Second Law says that a system is 
highly likely to exhibit thermodynamic-like behaviour (TD-like behaviour). We have TD-like 
behaviour iff the entropy of a system that is initially prepared in a low-entropy state increases 
until it comes close to its maximum value and then stays there, exhibiting frequent small and 
only rare large fluctuations away from equilibrium.11 Notice the reference to ‘highly likely’ in 
the statement of the Second Law. In effect the law introduces a probability )(TSp  that a given 
system S behaves in a TD-like way, and it states that the value of this probability is close to 
one.   
 
There is an entirely different way of looking at the gas in a box. As a matter of fact, the gas is 
a collection of molecules, each governed by the laws of mechanics. In what follows we 
assume these laws to be the ones of classical mechanics (CM). The microstate of a system 
consisting of n  particles is specified by a point x  in its n6 -dimensional phase space Γ , 
which is endowed with the Lebesgue measure µ . The dynamics of the system is governed by 
Hamilton's equations of motion, which define a measure-preserving phase flow tφ  on Γ . 
More precisely, Γ→Γ:tφ  is a one-to-one mapping for every real number t  and 
)())(( RRt µφµ =  for every measurable region Γ⊆R . We assume that the relevant physical 
process begins at a particular instant 0t  and adopt the convention that )(xtφ  denotes the state 
of the system at time tt +0  if it was in state x  at 0t , and likewise )(Rtφ ; x  is then commonly 
referred to as the ‘initial condition’. The flow tφ  is deterministic and hence, together with the 
initial condition x  of a gas completely determines the behaviour of the gas.12 
 
Statistical Mechanics (SM) aims to establish a connection between the TD way and the 
mechanical way of looking at the system and account for TD behaviour in terms of the 
dynamical laws governing the microscopic constituents of macroscopic systems and 
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probabilistic assumptions. We now briefly review classical SM and discuss in some detail 
how probabilities are introduced into a mechanical theory.13 
 
It is the basic posit of Boltzmannian SM (BSM) that the kM  supervene on the system’s 
microstates. Therefore each macrostate kM  is associated with a macroregion Γ⊆Γk  so that 
the system is in macrostate kM  at t  iff its microstate x  lies within kΓ  at t . The Boltzmann 
entropy of a macrostate is defined as ))(log()( kBkB kMS Γ= µ , where Bk  is the Boltzmann 
constant. Since the system is only exactly in one macrostate/macroregion at a given moment 
in time, we can define the Boltzmann entropy of the system simply as the entropy of the 
current macrostate: ))(log()( tBB ktS Γ= µ , where tΓ  is the macroregion in which the system’s 
microstate is located at time t . It can be shown that the equilibrium state is by far the largest 
of all states (relative to the measure µ ), a fact known as the dominance of the equilibrium 
state. Since the logarithm is a monotonic function it follows that the entropy is maximal in 
equilibrium.  
 
Deriving the (above statistical version of the) Second Law from the fundamental laws of 
mechanics and probabilistic assumptions is an important aim of SM. By assumption the 
systems starts in a low entropy non-equilibrium macro state. That this be the case is the 
subject matter of the so-called Past Hypothesis, and the system’s low entropy macro state is 
called the past state.14 Since the past state and the equilibrium state are of particular 
importance, we introduce special labels and denote the former by pM  (associated with pΓ ) 
and the latter by eqM  (associated with eqΓ ).  
 
It is now time to introduce the concept of ergodic motion.15 Metaphorically speaking, a 
trajectory is ergodic if it evenly spreads out on the entire accessible phase space and does not, 
 9 
for instance, get stuck in one corner. More precisely, the motion of a system is ergodic iff for 
any set Γ⊆A , the proportion of time the trajectory spends in A  is equal to the proportion of 
the measure that A  takes up in Γ  in the long run (for instance, if A  occupies a quarter of Γ , 
then the system spends a quarter of the time in A ). If a trajectory is ergodic, then the system 
behaves TD-like because the dynamics will carry the system’s state into eqΓ  and will keep it 
there most of the time (because eqΓ  is much larger than any other macro region). The system 
will move out of the equilibrium region every now and then and visit non-equilibrium states. 
Yet since these are small compared to eqΓ  it will only spend a small fraction of time there. 
Accordingly the entropy is close to its maximum most of the time and fluctuates away from it 
only occasionally.  
 
As a matter of fact, whether or not a system’s motion is ergodic depends on the initial 
condition: some initial conditions lie on trajectories that are ergodic while others don’t. This 
realisation is the clue to introducing probabilities. Consider an arbitrary measurable subset 
pC Γ⊆ . We may postulate that the probability that the initial condition x  lies within C  at 
time 0t  is 
 
)(
)()(
p
CCp Γ= µ
µ  ,                 (Eq. 2) 
 
which is well-defined because it is a fact of physics that 0)( >Γpµ . Let us refer to this 
principle as the Past Hypthesis Proportionality Postulate (PHPP). We now denote by pΓ⊆Ω  
the subset of all initial conditions that lie on ergodic trajectories; )(Ωp  is  the probability that 
x  lies within Ω  at time 0t . We then immediately get: 
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)()( Ω= pTSp                           (Eq. 3) 
 
We now see that )(TSp  has two aspects. From TD it inherits a solid connection to observable 
matters of fact, and via SM it is connected to the fundamenal underlying mechanics. This will 
be important in the next section.  
 
 
4. Interpreting SM Probabilities as HOC’s 
 
It is tempting to interpret the above probabilities as epistemic probabilities. There is nothing 
chancy about a system’s initial condition; there is a matter of fact about the system’s 
microstate at 0t . One just doesn’t know what this state is, and )(TSp  quantifies our ignorance 
about the system’s true microstate. But this argument is unsatisfactory. The point is simple 
and has been made by many: these probabilities stem from basic laws of physics and the 
objective behaviour of natural systems, describe how things are, and are not rooted in what we 
fail to know (see, for instance, Redhead, 1995). 
 
We think that this intuition is correct and now argue that )(TSp  can be interpreted as a HOC. 
This interpretation faces an immediate challenge: how could there be chances in a world that 
obeys deterministic laws? Lewis (1986, 118-120) famously held that chance and determinism 
were incompatible, and many share his intuition. We do not. It is instructive, though, to see 
what line of reasoning leads to a rejection of deterministic chance.  
 
Unfortunately Lewis does not make the reason for his verdict explicit. Hoefer (2007, 558-9) 
provides the following reconstruction of the incompatibilist’s argument. Let Ht be the 
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complete history of the world up to time t; let L be the conjunction of all laws governing our 
world; and let cht(E)=x be the non-trivial chance of E at time t (i.e. 0<x<1). Lewis regards 
historical facts and laws as admissible (1986, 92). PP then tells us that  
 
cr(E | cht(E)=x & Ht & L) = x 
 
However, given that L is deterministic, Ht and L jointly imply E (assuming E is true; they 
imply ¬E if E is false). Hence the axioms of probability dictate that  
 
cr(E | cht(E)=x & Ht & L) =1. 
 
So deterministic chances and PP as used here together with the axioms of probability, which 
credences must satisfy, lead to a contradiction. Lewis’ way to avoid this contradiction is to 
deny that there are chances for events that are governed by deterministic laws: cht(E)=x 
simply doesn’t exist.  
 
This response is closely tied to Lewis’ metaphysics. The world consists of a manifold of 
spacetime points, which stand in various relations to one another. These spacetime points are 
simple particulars, meaning that they are individuals with no proper parts. Each spacetime 
point instantiates perfectly natural monadic properties, which stand in various spatiotemporal 
relations to one another. This ontology is based on classical physics and Lewis realised that it 
was so austere that it may not be able to accommodate modern physics. The point in 
upholding it nevertheless, he thought, was ‘not to support reactionary physics, but rather to 
resist philosophical arguments that there are more things in heaven and earth than physics has 
dreamt of’ (1994, 474). So while he would accept adjustments to the system that are needed to 
accommodate, say, quantum theory, these adjustments would have to be such that no 
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properties other than the properties of basic physics would be allowed into it: ‘“how things 
are” is fully given by the fundamental, perfectly natural, properties and relations those things 
instantiate’ (ibid.). The question of what counts as a perfectly natural property is answered by 
physics. So all that there is are facts about spacetime points and their spatiotemporal relations 
along with perfectly natural properties they instantiate – all other facts are determined by 
these basic facts. This is Lewis’ physicalism, ‘the thesis that physics – something not too 
different from present-day physics, though presumably somewhat improved – is a 
comprehensive theory of the world, complete as well as correct. The world is as physics says 
it is, and there’s no more to say.’ (Lewis, 1999, 33-34)  
 
It follows from such a view that the predicates of sciences other than fundamental physics are 
not perfectly natural and that therefore there are no laws that are expressed in the language of, 
say, biology, geology, or meteorology.  And Lewis, recall, advocates a Best System account 
of laws plus chances, not merely a Best System account of objective chances.  It is then clear 
why he resolves the problem that deterministic chances do not satisfy PP by denying that 
there are chances for E in a deterministic world. If E is about fundamental properties, then, on 
pain of contradiction, there cannot be chance laws for it in a deterministic world (the 
contradiction being the one sketched just above). If, by contrast, E is about non-fundamental 
types (such as coins, macrostates, or genes) then a best system will not contain any laws for 
E-type events (and a fortiori no chance laws): a best system simply does not say anything 
about E-type events because fundamental physics is complete and comprehensive and 
everything that can be said about everything that there is can be said in terms of fundamental 
physics.  
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We find Lewis’ approach overly restrictive. Even if there are deterministic fundamental laws, 
there is room in a Best System approach for chance rules about events and kinds at non-
fundamental levels. In the remainder of this section we show how this is possible. 
 
The starting point of our argument is to deny that everything that can be said about the world 
can be said in terms of fundamental physics. Probability rules can be formulated in terms 
pertaining to different levels of discourse such as macro physics, chemistry, genetics, 
mechanical engineering and meteorology, and probability rules formulated in such terms have 
equal right to be considered for inclusion in a Best System package of rules, alongside micro-
level rules. We call this view chance-rule pluralism (CRP). We provide arguments in support 
of CRP in Section 5.2. In this section we argue for the conditional claim that if we accept 
CRP, then )(TSp , and with it scads of probability rules from non-fundamental physics, 
biology, and many other sciences, are plausibly part of a Best System. 
 
The first step is to show that the above contradiction in terms of credences can be avoided. 
The key to a solution is to realise that what drives the contradiction is cross level information: 
we add information about fundamental physics to rules about coins, macro-states, and genes. 
But such information must be inadmissible: chance rules operate at a specific level and 
evidence pertaining to more fundamental levels is inadmissible. Far from being an ad hoc 
stipulation, this requirement is a natural consequence of the definition of admissibility given 
in Section 2. Recall our characterisation of admissibility: a proposition P is admissible with 
respect to an outcome-specifying proposition E for chance set-up S iff P contains only the sort 
of information whose impact on reasonable credence about E, if any, comes entirely by way 
of impact on credence about the chances of those outcomes. This means that the complete 
history Ht together with the deterministic laws L are jointly inadmissible, because they 
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determine what will happen and hence give information maximally relevant for credence 
about E, and not by way of giving information about the chance of E.16, 17  
 
So there is no direct contradiction between deterministic laws and chance rules at higher 
levels; only an apparent contradiction that arises if one applies PP using Lewis’ understanding 
of admissibility.  If K contains no evidence pertaining to the micro level, then cr(E | cht(E)=x 
& K) = x by PP. If, by contrast, K does contain such evidence, plus the deterministic laws, 
then cr(E | cht(E)=x & K) = 1 by the axioms of probability. But there is no contradiction 
because PP itself tells us that our credence ought to be equal to the chance only in the absence 
of inadmissible evidence, and it remains silent about what our credence ought to be when we 
have inadmissible knowledge. In this case the answer is obviously 1 because E is implied by 
K.  
 
This does not render non-fundamental chances useless. In typical situations in which we 
observe coins or gases, we just don’t have inadmissible information, and indeed given our 
epistemic finitude, couldn’t have such information, nor calculate anything based on it if we 
did have it.  So instead, setting our credences via cht(E)=x  and PP serves us well.  
 
The removal of the apparent contradiction makes  non-fundamental chance rules  candidates 
for inclusion into the Best System (it now satisfies requirements 1 and 2 for HOC’s). But does 
their candidacy ever result in membership? We argue that it does. To this end we divide Best 
System approaches into two classes: those that offer a Best System account of chance alone 
(leaving non-chance laws of nature, if any, off to the side), and those that offer a unified Best 
System account of laws plus chances. The former approach is advocated by Hoefer (2007), 
while the latter has been the default approach of other Best System theorists since Lewis’ 
(1994).   
 15 
 
Under the chance-only Best System approach, non-fundamental chance rules obviously make 
the cut. Since by assumption the fundamental physical laws are deterministic, there are no 
chancy fundamental laws at all, and hence nothing at the fundamental level that could 
compete for inclusion in the Best System of chance rules. So all the chance rules that may be 
considered for inclusion into the Best System will be rules covering events at “higher” levels.   
 
Most philosophers who favour HOC, however, want to give a unified Best System account of 
laws and chances together, and on such an approach it may seem at first that there is a serious 
issue as to whether a Best System can contain fundamental deterministic laws and higher-
level chance rules as well.  The issue is not resolved just by embracing CRP; the question is, 
with deterministic laws in the System, how could adding any higher-level laws or rules at all 
make the system better? 
 
To see how this can work we need to say a bit more about how we understand simplicity and 
strength. As indicated above, these concepts are notoriously difficult to define precisely and 
we won’t try. However, it may help to notice that the very idea of a Humean Best System 
theory of laws involves a certain element of pragmatism and user-relativity, which makes the 
impreciseness of simplicity and strength (and their trade-offs) less disquieting.18  A Best 
System is an elegant, simple, and powerful way of summarizing and systematizing the 
patterns of events in the Humean Mosaic.  But omniscient beings have no need for a System 
at all, and Laplace’s demon-like super-intelligences have no need of simplicity.  A Best 
System is of use to finite and epistemically limited beings, such as ourselves.  It is a “guide to 
life”, just as objective chance is often said to be, for the epistemically handicapped.  For a 
System to be the laws of nature is, for a genuine Humean, nothing more than for it to be the 
best such guide to life that our HM allows.  And as such, the notions of simplicity and 
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strength that are at issue in the BSA are linked to the powers and perspectives of epistemically 
handicapped beings such as ourselves. So we think it is legitimate to rely on our own 
intuitions as we try to say something about simplicity and strength, and also to not worry 
about whether the imprecision of these notions makes it impossible to be sure that exactly one 
Best System exists out there for our world’s HM.19 
 
We maintain that the notions of strength and simplicity have several dimensions to them. 
Strength is a matter of how many things in HM are covered by the laws and rules of a system.  
“How many things” can refer both to tokens of events and to the types under which the tokens 
are subsumed.  So, ceteris paribus (literally: keeping all else equal), adding a rule to a system 
that applies to 109 distinct events in HM adds more strength than adding a rule that applies to 
only 100 events.  And adding a rule that covers 5 different types of chance setups adds more 
strength, again ceteris paribus, than adding a rule that covers just one new kind of chance 
setup.   
 
Of course adding rules to a system detracts, ceteris paribus, from its simplicity.  The number 
of rules is one dimension of simplicity; we call it numerical simplicity.  But recalling that Best 
Systems are meant to be “guides to life” for epistemically limited beings, we maintain that 
other types of simplicity should be taken into account.  So, for example, a system that entails 
coin flip probabilities, but only via quantum-like micro-chance laws, so that only a Laplace’s 
demon could actually calculate the chance of landing Heads, is in a sense much less simple 
than a system that is otherwise identical, but adds a simple rule stating Pr(H)= Pr(T) = ½.  
We call this derivation-simplicity. For a given natural language, Kolmogorov complexity 
gives one way to try to make the notion precise,20 though again we stress that we are not 
aiming to provide precise definitions.  Finally, and relatedly, there is simplicity of 
formulation:  assuming, again, a given natural language, then a law or chance rule that takes 
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many pages to write down is less simple than a rule that can be compactly expressed on a 
single line.  
 
Let us illustrate some of these points with an example. Consider a fictional world consisting 
of nothing but 10  coin tosses, 20 die throws and 50 spins of a roulette wheel, and assume that 
the outcomes of these events are nicely randomly distributed in the usual way so that the usual 
classical probabilities have good fit with the world’s history. System 1 contains three separate 
rules covering coins, dice and rouletter wheels respectively; system 2 contains one rule 
covering all gambling devices; system 3 contains one rule covering only coins and dice and 
says nothing about roulette wheels. We then can see that system 2 has a better combination of 
simplicity and strength than system 1, which in turn beats system 3 because the latter, while 
having fewer rules, also covers fewer types of chancy events and many fewer tokens.  There is 
a premium for covering cases that occur frequently (leaving out roulette wheels is penalised) 
and there is a reward for having fewer rules while keeping scope constant.  
 
Based on these notions of simplicity and strength, we now argue that non-fundamental rules 
can be part of a Best System because a system that has these rules in them strikes a better 
balance between simplicity and strength than ones that don’t (throughout we assume that the 
systems under considerations are on par as regards fit). The conclusion is obviously true for 
anti-reductionists: non-fundamental rules cover cases that aren’t covered by fundamental 
rules. If instances covered aren’t extremely rare, then strength increases significantly while 
simplicity decreases only a little, and hence overall the system with nonfundamental 
probability is better than the system that is restricted to fundamental rules (we return to the 
rarity issue below)   
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The more interesting case is the one in which reductionism in the sense of supervenience is 
true. To see how the argument plays out we first consider that case where we have 
inderministic laws at the fundamental level, for instance because the world is at bottom 
quantum mechanical (and quantum mechanics is understood in the standard way). As an 
example consider the probability rule discussed in (Lehe, Hallatschek, and Peliti, 2012), 
specifying how the probability of a successful mutation increases as a function of distance 
from the bulk of the population in species that are expanding their territorial range.21 
Introducing such a rule into the system leaves that system’s strength unchanged because, per 
supervenience, every case covered by a non-fundamental probability rule is also covered by a 
fundamental one. At the same time there is a loss in numerical simplicity because the number 
of rules in the system increases. So the strength versus-numerical simplicity balance would 
count against the introduction of non-fundamental rules. However, the system’s derivational 
simplicity is greatly increased. It is hugely costly to start from first principles every time one 
wants to make a prediction about a non-fundamental object like a genetic mutation in a 
population, and a system becomes significantly simpler if we write in rules about such 
objects.22 As already mentioned, quantifying the gain in derivational simplicity is notoriously 
difficult. But the fact that no one has yet succeeded in deducing a single biological probability 
from anything like first principles, let alone from fundamental quantum theory, suggests that 
the costs of such a derivation are indeed significant, and certainly sufficiently high to 
compensate for the relatively small loss in numerical simplicity due to the addition of one 
extra rule.  
 
Let us now turn to the case in which the fundamental laws are deterministic. Not only can we 
never derive a probability rule from the micro-level laws. We also face the above problem 
that cht(E)=x assigns a non-trivial chance to E while Ht & L imply E. Given this, how can 
cht(E)=x (with x<1) possibly be part of the Best System?   
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For reasons similar to the ones we considered above in the indeterministic case, such rules can 
earn their place in a Best System. Even though the fundamental theory and non-fundamental 
rules make different statements about HM, they cover the same setups (e.g. coins and gasses), 
which would count against their inclusion. However, while deterministic laws may, with the 
help of infinitely precise initial conditions, cover macro-level events, the derivational 
simplicity of a system can be vastly improved, vis a vis macro-level events, by the 
introduction of non-fundamental chance rules, with only a small cost in terms of the number 
of rules/laws in the system.23 
 
The only remaining questions are:  Does a proposed chance rule have good fit with the events 
in HM, and does the gain in derivational simplicity outweigh the loss of simplicity caused by 
adding an additional rule? 
 
For statistical mechanical probabilities such as )(TSp , at least, we think the answers to both 
questions are affirmative, though the first one is mostly empirical and depends on facts about 
the HM which we can’t claim to know with certainty.  As we have seen in Section 3, )(TSp  
has two aspects, one macro and one micro. The macro aspect is that it captures an observable 
pattern of events. The micro aspect is that is is connected to the fundamental underlying 
theory via its mechanical description and the probility distribution )(Cp  (which, it is worth 
emphasising, is not itself part of the fundamental theory). In effect )(Cp  expresses the 
probability that a system’s microstate is in set pC Γ⊆ .  
 
Now look at this probability from the point of view of THOC. There is a well circumscribed 
class of objects to which a chance rule like PHPP applies (gases, etc.). Each of these is a 
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classical system and hence has a precise initial condition x  at 0t , which, by assumption, lies 
within pΓ . Now go through the entire HM and put every single initial condition x  into pΓ . 
The result of this is a swarm of points in pΓ . Then recall from above that THOC is essentially 
a refinement of finite frequentism and chances should closely track relative frequencies 
wherever such frequencies are available. Hence the chance of an initial condition being in set 
C  given that it lies in pΓ  is the fraction of points in set pΓ  that lie in C  (in the same way in 
which the chance of heads is, or is close to, the fraction of heads in the set of all coin toss 
outcomes). But listing all points individually and checking whether they lie in C  is extremely 
cumbersome and won’t make for simple system. So we have to reduce the complexity of the 
sytem by giving a simple summary of the distribution of points. To this end we approximate 
the swarm of points with a continuous distribution (which can be done using one of the well-
known fitting techniques such as the method of the least mean squares or kernel dressing) and 
normalise it. The result of this is a probability density fuction ρ  on pΓ , which can be 
regarded as an expression of the ‘initial condition density’ in different subsets C  of pΓ .24  
 
The good-fit constraint now is that )(Cρ  be equal to (or in very close agreement with) 
)(/)( pC Γµµ  for all subsets C  of pΓ . This is a non-trivial constraint. For it to be true  it has 
to be the case that the initial conditions are more or less evenly distributed over pΓ  because 
)(/)( pC Γµµ  is a flat distribution over pΓ . If it turned out that all initial conditions were 
crammed into one corner of pΓ , then Eq. 2 would have poor fit, which would preclude it 
being part of the Best System, despite its great simplicity. So the requirement 
ρ(C) ≈ µ(C) / µ(Γ p )  presents a real touchstone for the system. Eq. 3 is then dealt with easily. 
This requirement has to hold for all C , a fortiori it has to hold for E  and so Eq. 3 gives the 
right chances if ρ(E) ≈ µ(E) / µ(Γ p ) . 
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The second question concerns the inclusion of statistical mechanical chances in the Best 
System is:  is the gain in derivational simplicity/real-use strength big enough to compensate 
the slight loss in rule-count simplicity?  We think it is obvious that it is, given how ubiquitous 
gases and other systems covered by statistical mechanics are, in our world.  We would go 
further and argue that the same goes for chance rules covering things like successful 
mutations, symmetrical gambling devices, and so on.  Here an objection can be raised, 
however, to the effect that the Earth is such a small corner of the HM that adding rules to 
cover any type of chance setup (gene mutations, coin flips) found only on Earth can only 
make a miniscule addition to a system’s strength, an addition that therefore intuitively cannot 
counterbalance the loss of simplicity caused by the addition of an extra rule.   
 
As noted before, it does not affect the question of whether statistical mechanical probabilities 
ought plausibly to be part of a Best System, since the systems covered are to be found all over 
the universe.  Let us now nevertheless offer a few remarks to try to deflate this objection as 
regards earth-only types.  In the first place, as we have seen above, the strength of a system is 
measured not only in terms of the number of tokens covered; it also depends on the number of 
types covered, and the increase in this dimension may well be dramatic once we include 
biology. But even those who are not moved by this consideration may want to avoid the 
conclusion that the strength of a chance rule is measured by the proportion of space-time in 
which it is applicable.  Indeed, such weighting arguably leads to disaster for the BSA, for a 
universe like ours.  Astrophysicists assure us that we may well live in a universe which will 
have an infinitely long (in time) future “heat death” state in which, basically, nothing happens.  
So the simplest and strongest system for a universe like ours – ignoring the tiny corner of 
spacetime in which interesting things actually happen – would surely be something like 
“Nothing happens but minor quantum fluctuations in an otherwise cold, dead, slowly 
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expanding space.”  And finally, of course, we can again invoke the fact that the Best System 
approach by its very nature should be a “guide to life” for epistemically limited agents – 
agents for whom, almost by definition, one corner of the HM is going to be more relevant and 
important than the vast regions with which they have no contact. 
 
In this section we have argued that the standard probability rule of statistical mechanics can 
plausibly be seen as a rule that would form part of a Humean Best System for a Newtonian 
world, despite the availability of a fully deterministic underlying dynamics. The rule would 
merit inclusion for the dramatic simplification (derivational simplicity) it brings to the capture 
of a pervasive regularity in HM:  that most systems behave in a TD-like fashion.  In the last 
section we turn a defense of chance-rule pluralism, and to addressing the worries some 
philosophers may have about whether determinism and objective chance really are compatible 
after all. 
 
 
 
5. Reverberations 
 
 
5.1 A kind of counterfeit chance? 
 
Lewis famously quipped that introducing chances in a deterministic setting results in a ‘kind 
of counterfeit chance’, which is ‘quite unlike genuine chance’ (Lewis, 1986, 120). And even 
writers more sympathetic to the cause of the determinist argue that the probabilities of SM 
and evolutionary theory should be considered a type of objective probability but not objective 
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chance. Lyon (2011), for instance, argues that they are a third type of probability which 
coincides neither with chance nor with subjective probability. 
 
There is no ultimate right and wrong in the use of a word, and depending on one’s other 
philosophical commitments one can reserve ‘chance’ to propensities, primitive fundamentally 
chancy laws of nature, or some kind of fundamental modality (no matter how they are 
analysed). So our aim is not to prove authors embracing this decision wrong; our aim is to 
make it plausible that there is no compulsion to follow them in doing so and that there is a 
different and equally legitimate use of ‘chance’ that does not come with such restrictions. We 
see our own analysis as best because it both best satisfies the desideratum of rationalizing PP, 
and lets us capture all the key uses of chance in science – and lets us do so whether or not the 
world’s fundamental physical laws are deterministic or indeterministic. 
 
THOC is a philosophical analysis of objective chance. ‘Objective chance’ here is meant to 
refer to our everyday folk notion of chances as objective facts, “out there in the world” in 
some sense, which are representable mathematically as probabilities, and which are the kinds 
of things that gamblers, actuaries and many sorts of scientists are keen to find out about.  Like 
any folk notion (like causation, reference, justice, for example), chance is not a sharply 
defined concept, and people will have divergent intuitions about which aspects or 
connotations associated with it are most central. This does not invalidate philosophical 
analysis, which aims to sharpen vague intuitions and mould them into consistent concepts. 
But it warns us that other analyses are always possible, and for the notion of chance they are 
currently proliferating in the literature. The aim in this section is to explicate how THOC 
differs from other Humean accounts of chance and make its distinctive features explicit. We 
see in particular THOC’s closeness to scientific practice and its ability reconcile chance with 
determinism as virtues which render it superior to its competitors. But we acknowledge that 
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those who cherish different aspects of chance will disagree on the relative value of the 
different accounts. The aim in this section is not to adjudicate between different outlooks. The 
aim is to make explicit wherein the differences lie and make it plausible that THOC is a 
legitimate and successful analysis of our folk notion of chance.   
 
 
5.2 Why accept chance-rule pluralism? 
 
Recall that CRP is the posit that probability rules can be formulated in terms pertaining to 
different levels of discourse and probability rules formulated in such terms have equal right to 
be considered for inclusion in a Best System package of rules, alongside rules at the 
fundamental level.25 What reasons are there to adopt such a principle?  
 
The answer to this question depends on one’s stand on reduction. Let us begin with 
antireductionism. This position comes in different versions, some of which fall under the label 
of ‘emergentism’. Antireductionists of all stripes will hold that the entities and properties at 
higher levels cannot be reduced (or at any rate not completely) to fundamental entities and 
properties at a fundamental level. In Anderson’s famous words: more is different (1972). In 
this vein Dupré insists that ‘there is a whole hierarchy of increasingly complex things that 
really exist, and that have causal powers that are not reducible to the mechanical combination 
of the powers of their constituents’ (2006, 15). It is an obvious consequence of such a view 
that a best system will contain chance rules for various levels.  
 
The more difficult question is why a reductionist would accept CRP. Like antireductionism, 
reductionism comes in different versions. The weakest version, and also most widely held, is 
the claim that the existence and properties of entities at all levels supervenes on the facts 
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about fundamental physical entities and their properties. Supervenience still has bite, because 
it entails that how non-fundamental entities behave is completely determined by how 
fundamental entities behave. It is important to notice, though, that the strong form of 
physicalism envisaged by Lewis – one holding that fundamental physics is a complete theory 
and that there is no more to say about the world than what physics says – is not a consequence 
of supervenience: one can consistently hold that all higher level entities/properties supervene 
on the entities/properties described by fundamental physics and that there theories other than 
fundamental physics are needed to provide a comprehensive description of what there is. So 
an argument over and above supervenience is needed to support that kind of physicalism.  
 
At this point it is instructive to notice a parallel with a long-standing debate in the philosophy 
of mind. Eliminativist materialism submits that folk psychology should not only be reduced to 
neuroscience, but actually be replaced by it: whatever can be said about metal activities can 
said in neuroscientific terms. The reductionism versus eliminativism debate in the philosophy 
exactly parallels the controversy around CRP, fundamental physics corresponding 
neuroscience and non-fundamental science to folk psychology. So Lewis’ physicalism really 
is a form of eliminativism, and it is therefore illustrative to look at the arguments supporting 
eliminativism in the philosophy of mind.  
 
Arguments in support of eliminativism typically are arguments against folk psychology. 
Proponents of eliminativism argue that folk psychology is profoundly wrong and predictively 
unsuccessful because central tenets of folk psychology radically misdescribe cognitive 
processes, that folk psychology is not a fertile research programme, and that ordinary mental 
states cannot in any way be reduced to, or be identified with, the brain states of neuroscience 
(see, for instance, Churchland, 1981, and ; Churchland, 1986).  
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Typical arguments against elimintivism therefore take the form of a defence of folk 
psychology (see, for instance, Horgan and Woodward, 1985 ). Carrying this argument in 
support of eliminativism over to the case at hand would amount to arguing that non-
fundamental theories are profoundly wrong and predictively unsuccessful, and that they form 
stagnant research programmes. That this would be hopeless enterprise becomes clear as soon 
as one starts writing a list of theories that would have to be thus discarded: statistical 
mechanics, thermodynamics, chemistry, molecular genetics, etc. Needless to say, none of 
these theories is free of internal difficulties, but it is hard to see that these would justify a 
dismissal of, say, molecular genetics as on par with folk psychology even if one grants that 
arguments against folk psychology are successful (which is by no means uncontroversial). We 
regard this position as a non-starter.  
 
And things get worse for the eliminativist. Not only is the main argument in support 
eliminativism unsuccessful in our context; there are reasons against it. The first is that 
supervenience relation is one that hold between two (sets of) properties and this trivially 
implies that there are non-fundamental properties. That, say, temperature supervenes on 
average kinetic energy presupposes that a system has a temperature, and we can only express 
this supervenience relation if our scientific language contains a term referring to temperature. 
One might try to downplay the importance of non-fundamental properties by endorsing 
ontological innocence, the claim that supervenient properties really are nothing over and 
above the properties in the supervenience base and have therefore no ontological status.  
 
But this more is of no help. Ontological innocence is controversial (van Inwagen, 1994), and 
even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the thesis stands, it will not help the 
eliminativist. To begin with, CRP is a posit about scientific theories, not ontology. It says that 
theories can be formulated at different levels and refer to properties at different levels; it is not 
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committed to the claim the properties at non-fundamental levels are in some sense sui generis. 
And what is more, deflating supervenient properties is successful only as long as there is a 
type-type identity. But many non-fundamental properties are multiply realisable, meaning that 
the same non-fundamental property can be realised by a number of distinct fundamental 
kinds. This is true not only in psychology (the classical example being pain); we find multiply 
realised properties even in close-to-fundamental physics: temperature in gases and 
temperature in spin systems have completely different micro-realisers. This is a problem for 
the eliminativist because the only thing these realisers have in common is that they are 
realisers of a certain non-fundamental property. There is no way to group these together 
without making reference to non-fundamental kinds, and hence not everything that can be 
said about these kinds can be said only in terms of the fundamental theory.26 
 
The second argument against eliminativism is that supervenience claims by themselves do 
nothing more than assert that a certain pattern of property variation hold (you can’t vary the 
supervening properties without also varying the base properties), but they do not say why this 
pattern holds and where the dependency comes from. This is widely seen as a problem, and it 
is natural to look for an explanation (Kim, 1998). Whatever such an explanation will look 
like, it will have to make reference to the higher level properties and hence cannot be 
eliminativist.  
 
For these reasons elimintivism as not a plausible position. Let us add a further reason for this 
conclusion, even though it is one that elimativists would dismiss as mere (and misguided) 
opinion. The point is that eliminativism is little more than a philosopher’s dream. Real science 
has never borne any resemblance to it, and there is no evidence that it ever will. In our view a 
Best System should not be entirely disconnected to how science as practised by scientists 
looks like. Science has always operated at different levels, it is widely recognised that 
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disciplines working at a certain level do so with a great deal of autonomy, and both methods 
and  explanatory practices are closely tied to discipline-specific domains of discourse. A 
Humean Best System approach should aim at capturing this feature of science and therefore 
ought to recognise (at least in principle) chances found in all the sciences. If this is so, then 
higher level entities form part of the Humean mosaic and certain statistical generalisations 
about them will be part of the overall best system. And we are glad to report that even 
outspoken radical reductionists seem agree. Nobel Prize winning physicist Steven Weinberg 
first observes that: ‘no one doubts that with a large enough computer we could in principle 
explain all the properties of DNA by solving the equations of quantum mechanics for 
electrons and the nuclei of a few common elements, whose properties are explained in turn by 
the standard model’ (Weinberg, 1993, 24-5), but immediately adds that: ‘[t]here is no reason 
to suppose that the convergence of explanation [i.e. the solving fundamental equations to 
explain non-fundamental properties] must lead to a convergence of scientific methods. 
Thermodynamics and chaos and population biology will each continue to operate with its own 
language, under its own rules, whatever we learn about elementary particles’ (ibid., 33).  
 
 
5.3 Anything goes? 
 
An evergreen among the criticisms of HBS approaches of all stripes is that simplicity and 
strength are psychological concepts and that this opens the flood gates for radical relativism: 
if we don’t like the laws we find, we just change the way we think and get different laws. As 
noted earlier, Lewis responded to this charge by observing that ‘[i]f nature is kind, the best 
system will be robustly best – so far ahead of its rivals that it will come out first under any 
standards of simplicity and strength and balance’ (1994, 479). He adds that there is of course 
no guarantee that nature is kind, but also no evidence to the contrary. And if it turned out that 
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nature wasn’t kind then we should blame the demise of a solid notion of lawhood on an 
unkind nature and not on the HBS analysis (ibid.).  
 
We agree with Lewis on this point and set worries about radical relativism aside. In doing so 
we also assume that laws and chance rules are formulated in a natural language. If we allow 
artificial constructions, then indeed almost anything goes. We could, for instance, conjoin all 
chance rules in a system to form a super rule, and thereby bring n-simplicity down to a 
minimum. We know of no principled way to rule out such manoeuvres, but there is also no 
evidence that they are a serious problem for science. So we follow Lewis (1983) in assuming 
that laws and chance rules be formulated in some natural language. Lewis thought that a 
natural language was the language of ‘something not too different from present-day physics, 
though presumably somewhat improved’ (Lewis, 1999, 33-34). We agree with that but would 
add that the same move be made for non-fundamental disciplines: a natural language for 
micro biology, for instance, would contain terms like ‘gene’ and be an improved version of 
something like current molecular biology.  
 
A related criticism is that simplicity and strength are too vague to base a robust notion of law 
or chance on them. There is no denying that these concepts are bound to have a certain degree 
of vagueness to them. Does that make THOC (or related Humean accounts by Lewis, Loewer, 
Callender & Cohen and others – for all invoke the same virtues) hopelessly unclear or ill-
defined?  We think not, obviously, and want to make two points in support of our optimism.  
 
Firstly, assuming that artificial constructs like the above super rule are excluded by the natural 
language requirement, the vagueness pertaining to these concepts is greatly reduced. In 
particular, derivational simplicity is non-arbitrary if one commits to a particular language. As 
we have suggested above, it could, for instance, be measured in terms of Kolmogorov 
 30 
complexity, which is an objective measure if we assume a particular language as given. The 
details of such proposals need more work, but we believe the situation is not as hopeless as 
critics want us to believe.  
 
Secondly, the prominence of the role of PP in THOC also provides a sort of guarantee that the 
imprecision of simplicity and strength can’t do too much harm.  If someone interprets the 
Bestness competition in such a way that the winning system is too restrictive, having little 
strength or covering only fundamental physical interactions (say), then their version can’t be 
what THOC aims at, because THOC aims (clause (2)) to give us the right things to plug into 
PP.  A too-restricted system would leave out potential probability rules that clearly do deserve 
to plug into PP, and do HBS-supervene on the HM, under a better understanding of 
simplicity, strength etc.  Conversely, a too-unrestricted system would include a plethora of 
chance rules that cover, say, gerrymandered classes of objects and/or many chance rules with 
only one or a few instantiations in HM.  For such a profligate system, the proofs of PP 
mentioned earlier (see Hoefer 2007 and Frigg and Hoefer 2010) would fail, hence they could 
not be what THOC aims at.  So we regard THOC as clearly – and by design – apt for 
capturing the core of our uses of objective chance, even if the notion of “Best” in “Best 
System” is not definable with any great precision. 
 
 
5.4 Platitudes about chance reconsidered 
 
Jonathan Schaffer (2007) formulated six platitudes about chance with the aim to convince the 
reader of the incompatibility of chance and determinism. We now revisit these platitudes from 
the point of view of THOC. Some of these alleged platitudes in fact aren’t platitudes and 
hence need not worry the compatibilist. Other platitudes can be re-interpreted so that they 
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hold true in THOC. So THOC can capture different but related platitudes to Schaffer’s. This 
lends further support our claim in Section 5.1 that THOC is a legitimate analysis of our folk 
notion of chance.  
 
The first of Schaffer’s platitudes is no mere platitude, being precisely PP itself. Needless to 
say, we agree with the spirit of this platitude but understand PP differently than Schaffer 
because we have a different notion of admissibility: Schaffer (along with Lewis) regards the 
total history and laws as admissible while (roughly speaking) we only regard evidence at the 
chance rule’s level as admissible.  
 
Similar remarks pertain to the case of Schaffer’s second platitude, the link between chance 
and (future) possibilities.  He starts with the Basic Chance Principle (BCP), which asserts that 
if at t there is a non-trivial objective chance of future event A occurring, then there is a 
possible world with the same history up to t, in which A has the same objective chance as it 
actually has, and in which A in fact occurs. Schaffer actually proposes a stronger version of 
this platitude, his Realization Principle (RP) stating that this other possible world in which A 
occurs should have the same laws as our world.  
 
THOC denies that BCP/RP as formulated by Schaffer is a platitude, but endorses a closely 
related principle that differs from Schaffer’s by restricting  ‘the same history up to t’ to the 
admissible history – in the case of statistical mechanics this is the macro-history. Thus 
understood, there can be branching. Of course, the proponents of BCP/RP will reject this 
reading of ‘same history’; they mean the full history in all detail.  Fixing the precise initial 
condition of the world rules out all but one macro history provided the underlying dynamics is 
deterministic, and hence BCP is violated. In a view that sees chances as operating a certain 
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level and decrees cross level evidence as inadmissible in conjunction with laws, such a choice 
is not forced upon us.  
 
Schaffer’s next principle seems linked to the notion that chance and chanciness have 
something to do with the “openness” of the future.  His formulation of the Futurity Principle 
(FP) says that if an event has, at time t, chance strictly between zero and one, then that event 
(or its failure to occur) lie to the future of t.  All past events that occurred have chance 1 (or 
no chance); all events that might have occurred in the past but didn’t now have chance 0 (or 
no chance).  
 
This platitude is independent of the issues surrounding determinism. THOC could be 
formulated so that it satisfy FP, and our reasons not do so have nothing to do with our views 
about determinism and chance. One awkward aspect of FP is that it requires that we make 
sense of an objective past/future division of all events (since we are, after all, discussing 
objective chance). In a relativistic world, this requirement is of course highly problematic.  
For this reason, among others, Hoefer (2007, 554) proposes that, for events, we make our 
platitude be “once chancy, always chancy”. Your coin flip of yesterday was a chancy event, 
i.e., an event assigned a non-trivial objective chance by the HOC rules in our world.  It still is 
such an event. Of course, your credence in the coin landing Heads is probably now either zero 
or 1 – because you have inadmissible evidence about the outcome, of course.  But the 
probabilistic nature of a coin flip is the same, whether in your “past” or your “future”. 
 
Next in line is the Lawful Magnitude Principle (LMP), which codifies the idea that ‘chance 
values should fit with the values projected by the laws of nature. For instance, if the chance 
that the coin lands heads is 0.5, then the laws should codify that value (via history-to-chance 
conditionals)’ (2007, p. 126). This principle codifies the assumption that chances should in 
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the end be derivable from fundamental, probabilistic physical laws. However, we submit that 
LM is not (or at any rate should not be) a widely held platitude about chance. There are 
chances that are not connected to fundamental laws (at least not in an obvious way). The 
chance of a particular macrostate transitions in SM, the chance of malfunctioning of a turbine, 
the chance of cancer after being exposed to a certain amount of radiation, and the chance of 
an increase in global mean temperature of more than two degrees centigrade by 2050 are not 
connected to fundamental laws and yet, according to THOC, are objective chances. 
 
The Causal Transition Constraint (CTC) specifies that chances should be pushing events 
around directly, as they unfold in time. CTC stipulates that if an objective chance “plays a 
role in the causal transition from d to e”, then t must be temporally between td and te.  This 
seems intended to capture the propensity theorist’s conception of chance propensities as 
“partial causes” helping to bring about events as time unfolds. As with LMP, we would deny 
that this constraint has the status of a platitude, except to a person who already thinks that 
“chance” means “law-governed primitive propensity”, and furthermore thinks of propensities 
along the lines of causal powers. It’s status as platitude is also problematic because our best 
fundamental science makes no mention about of this kind of causal transitions at all.27 
 
Lastly, there is the Intrinsicness Requirement (IR) which stipulates that  “[i]f e′ is an intrinsic 
duplicate of e, and the mereological sum of the events at t′ is an intrinsic duplicate of the 
mereological sum of the events at t, then ch<pe, w, t> = ch<pe′ , w, t′>”28 (2007, p. 125). A 
more intuitive way to read IR is as follows:  if you have the same (physically identical) set-up 
conditions at two different times, then the chances of all their corresponding possible 
outcomes must be the same.  So interpreted, THOC clearly satisfies IR when it comes to BSM 
chances. The platitude “same set-up, same probabilities” will only be violated by HOC’s if 
HM is such that the Best System must contain some time- or space-variable chance rules, i.e. 
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rules where the rule explicitly states that the chances vary depending only on time or place in 
the universe. There is no reason to suppose that anything like this is true in our world, and 
certainly the phenomena falling under BSM show no such non-universality. IR does capture a 
fairly widely held platitude about objective chance, without begging any questions concerning 
determinism; and THOC has no trouble complying with it.  
 
To sum up:  THOC satisfies suitably qualified versions of PP, LMP, IR and BCP/RP; and we 
deny that FP and CT are platitudes about chance.  
 
 
5.5 Reinventing the wheel? 
 
Loewer  (2001, 2004) has presented a Humean reconciliation of determinism and chance, and 
so we want to end by pointing out wherein the differences lie. To this end let us now come 
back to an assumption we made rather silently but which plays in important role in our 
discussion, namely that the systems under investigation are ‘laboratory systems’ like gases in 
containers, liquids in tanks, and solids on tables. This is what SM is mostly applied to in the 
hands of working physicists, and so there is nothing objectionable about this restriction. 
However, following Albert (2000), Loewer considerably extends the domain of application of 
the theory, and treats the entire universe as one large SM system. Much of what we said about 
HOC’s is independent of what one takes the relevant systems to be. There is one essential 
difference, though, namely how we understand the Humean supervienience of probability 
rules. As we have seen above, we interpret the even distributions over the past state (which 
occur in Equations 2 and 3) as an elegant summary of actual initial conditions as they occur in 
the HM of a world like ours. Such an interpretation is not open to those who take BSM to be a 
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theory about the universe as a whole, since there is only exactly one initial condition of the 
universe.  
 
Our take on the distributions has two advantages over Loewer’s approach. First, postulating a 
probability distribution for an event that not only happens only once in the entire history of 
the universe, but is in fact the only probabilistic event ever, seems conceptually problematic 
even if one takes frequency tolerance seriously, and it violates our requirement of Humean 
coherence. There is no demonstration of how the PHPP supervenes on the classical particle 
motions in HM; if that rule, applied to numerous small subsystems of the world, does happen 
to make predictions with good fit to the patterns in HM, that is a happy accident, but not 
something that obviously follows from the global probability rule postulated in Loewer’s 
approach. 
 
Second, one can show that the fit of a system can be improved by choosing a peaked rather 
than a flat (Lebesgue) distribution over 
 
Γp  (Frigg, 2008a, 2010).  A peaked distribution, 
nearly dirac-delta style, over the world’s actual initial condition is, qua postulate, just as 
simple as a flat distribution, but it will assign significantly higher probabilities to the actual 
world’s macro-state transitions, and hence give the system to which it belongs a much higher 
fit. So the best system is not one with the flat distribution but one which has a distribution that 
is peaked over the actual initial condition. This has the undesirable conclusion that the 
probabilities defined in Equations 2 and 3 are not chances. This objection is based on the fact 
that the distribution over the past state is not dictated by facts about initial conditions (there is 
only one!) and hence there is a great degree of freedom in choosing the distribution. This is 
not so if one understands the distribution to be a summary of (many!) actual initial conditions 
of systems like gases all over the Humean mosaic. If the initial conditions of these systems are 
roughly evenly distributed, then one cannot choose a peaked distribution. So that problem is 
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effectively solved in an approach focussing on small isolated systems rather than the universe 
as a whole.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have provided a reformulation of Lewis’ HBS approach to chance. Thus reformulated, 
HOC’s are compatible with underlying deterministic laws and provide a viable interpretation 
of SM probabilities. A key element in the reconciliation of determinism and chance is the 
realisation that chances are specific to a certain level. This is a consequence of CRP, which 
we defend by drawing parallels to the situation in the philosophy of mind.  
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1 The presentation of HOC in this section is based on our (2010). The classical source is (Lewis, 1980). But as 
we will see below, our version of HOC differs from Lewis’ in important respects.  
2 As is well known, there are different axiomatisations of probability. Nothing in what follows depends on which 
axiomatisation we chose.  
3 We use this term in restrictive way: only statements having exactly that form are chance rules. Existence 
claims, statements about upper and lower bounds, or specifications of probability intervals are not chance rules 
in our sense.  
4 This point has been made by Alan Hájek (2007) for propensities. His arguments readily carry over to any 
notion of chance.  
5 In this we disagree with Lewis, who thought it a major problem to prove that chances satisfy the axioms of 
probability. THOC defines chance, and a function that does not satisfy the axioms of probability cannot be a 
chance function. 
6 Justifying PP is a thorny issue, and, unsurprisingly, one fraught with controversy. We refer the reader to our 
(2010, Section 3.4) and references therein for a discussion.  
7 For a discussion see Hoefer (2007, 553-5 and 558-60). Some philosophers maintain that the PP needs no 
admissibility clause (e.g. Meacham 2010). For counter-arguments in favour of the necessity of an admissibility 
clause in PP see (Hoefer, 2013).  
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8 Note that even if you believe that the world does contain necessary connections, powers or propensities, it still 
also has a HM. The HM is just the panoply of actual events understood as purely occurrent, setting aside any 
modal aspects those events may possess. The Humean about chance then simply maintains that chance facts 
supervene on this HM. 
9 For a discussion of infinite sequences see (Elga, 2004). 
10 The assumption that macrostates can be indexed by an integer k is a common idealisation in this context and 
we follow this convention here; see (Frigg, 2008b) and references therein.  
11 This definition of TD-likeness is adapted from Lavis (2005). A different way reformulating the Second Law 
emerges from (Albert, 2000).  We prefer an approach based on TD-likeness for the reasons outlined in (Frigg 
and Werndl, 2011) and use it here because it’s simpler than Albert’s. Noting we say about chance depends on 
this choice, though, and mutatis mutandis our account of chance can also be applied to Albert’s transition 
probabilities.  
12 We base our discussion on the standard possible worlds definition of determinism; see (Earman, 1986, Ch. 2).  
13 We restrict attention to Boltzmannian SM. For detailed discussions of that theory, as well as of the Gibbsian 
approach which we set aside here, see Frigg (2008b) and Uffink (2006).  
14 Note that the term ‘Past Hypothesis’ is usually reserved for approaches in which the system under 
consideration is the entire universe; it then says that the universe came into being in a low entropy macrostate 
provided to us by modern Big Bang cosmology. We return to the issue of the nature of systems studied in SM 
Section 5.5.  
15 For an accessible introduction see (Berkovitz, Frigg, and Kronz, 2011). We assume that the relevant systems 
are ergodic (Frigg and Werndl, 2011). 
16 Note that determining what will happen is not the same as entailing that the objective chance of something 
happening is equal to one (and mutatis mutandis for not happening and chance equal to zero). 
17 Note that on our understanding of admissibility, it is not closed under logical conjunction, as Lewis supposed 
it to be. 
18 While Lewis tried to supress this element of pragmatism and user-relativity as much as he could without 
actually saying much at all about simplicity and strength, other BSA advocates such as Albert (2011), Callender 
and Cohen (2009) and Schrenk (2008) have openly embraced it. 
19 That said, we are sympathetic  with Lewis’ line on this point (1994, 479): we may, not unreasonably in light of 
actual science, hope that there is one robustly Best System for our HM, or a small family of closely resembling 
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cousins, that come out as Best under any reasonable ways of cashing out and weighing up the qualities of 
simplicity, strength and fit. 
20 Roughly, the Kolmogorov complexity is the length of the shortest computer programme that derives a certain 
result. With respect to a given language, the Kolmogorov complexity is an objective quantity.  
21 In a phenomenon known as ‘gene surfing’, genetic drift becomes a much stronger evolutionary force in 
populations at the edge of a territorial expansion wave, because genes from the individuals at/near the edge of 
the wave will be disproportionately represented in the gene pool of the newly colonized regions in subsequent 
generations. Lehe, Hallatschek and Peliti (2012) propose (in our terms) chance rules for the fixation of a 
favorable mutation as a function of distance of the individual in which the mutation occurs from the edge of the 
colonization wave. 
22 For a discussion of this point see (Frisch, 2011, forthcoming).  
23 This is so even if the output of the rule is merely a chance rather than a yes/no determination. When it comes 
to the chance p(TS) , which is almost always near-1, the information conveyed to the agent is nearly as strong 
as what is entailed by (but impossible to derive from) the deterministic laws plus IC’s.  
24 In this section our discussion idealises by pretending that the histories of all sorts of different SM systems 
could be treated as representable via paths in a single phase space. This is an idealisation because systems with a 
different particle number N have different phase spaces. We think that this is no threat to our approach. SM 
systems such as expanding gases and cooling solids are ubiquitous in HM and there will be enough of them for 
most N to ground a HBS supervenience claim. Those for which this is not the case (probably ones with very 
large N) can be treated along the lines of rare gambling devices such as dodecahedra: they will be seen as falling 
into the same class as more common systems and a flat distribution over possible initial conditions will be the 
best distribution in much the same way in which the 1/n rule is the best for all gambling devices. 
25 In section 4 we argued that if allowed to compete, some higher-level rules or laws may well deserve to make it 
into the Best System. Here the question is the prior one, which Lewis answered negatively:  should such rules 
even be allowed to compete? 
26 Fodor famously used multiple realisability as an argument against reduction (1974). Following (Dizadji-
Bahmani, Frigg, and Hartmann, 2010) we think that this is going too far, but multiple realisability does provide 
an argument against eliminativism. 
27 Lyon (2011) and Glynn (2010, 25-6) argue convincingly that CTC is unacceptable in any case no matter what 
view of chance one adopts. 
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28 In Schaffer’s notation, ch<pe, w, t> is the chance in world w, assessed at time t, that the proposition pe 
(asserting that event e happens) is true.  
